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Abstract— Software startups are typically under extreme 
pressure to get to market quickly with limited resources and high 
uncertainty. This pressure and uncertainty is likely to cause 
startups to accumulate technical debt as they make decisions that 
are more focused on the short-term than the long-term health of 
the codebase. However, most research on technical debt has been 
focused on more mature software teams, who may have less 
pressure and, therefore, reason about technical debt very 
differently than software startups. In this study, we seek to 
understand the organizational factors that lead to and the 
benefits and challenges associated with the intentional 
accumulation of technical debt in software startups. We 
interviewed 16 professionals involved in seven different software 
startups. We find that the startup phase, the experience of the 
developers, software knowledge of the founders, and level of 
employee growth are some of the organizational factors that 
influence the intentional accumulation of technical debt. In 
addition, we find the software startups are typically driven to 
achieve a “good enough level,” and this guides the amount of 
technical debt that they intentionally accumulate to balance the 
benefits of speed to market and reduced resources with the 
challenges of later addressing technical debt. 
Keywords— Technical Debt, Startup, Software development 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Software startups are freshly created companies with no 
operating history and mainly oriented towards developing 
high-tech and innovative products, aiming to grow their 
business in highly scalable markets [18], [10]. Startups often 
operate with limited resources and under extreme time pressure 
as they strive to produce their product and avoid being beaten 
to market by a competitor or running out of capital [19]. Thus, 
startups typically develop early software versions to test and 
validate emerging ideas to avoid wasteful implementation of 
complicated software which may be unsuccessful in the 
markets [26]. Under these conditions, often the extra effort 
required to design and implement software with an optimal 
design is considered an unaffordable luxury and a potential 
waste of time and effort.  
Software companies often make sub-optimal design 
decisions to allow them to get to market quickly [19]. For 
instance, the product might be built with an inflexible 
architecture that cannot be easily changed to speed up time-to-
market and let the startup put their product in users’ hands 
earlier, get feedback, and evolve it [3]. If and when the 
developed software becomes successful on the market, then the 
pressure turns modifying the software to meet the user needs 
(i.e., adding new features). This can cause startups to build 
upon the original inflexible architecture that was not designed 
to last for the long term and is not easily extendable. 
The result of this situation is the accrual of what is 
described as Technical Debt (TD). The TD metaphor was first 
coined at OOPSLA ‘92 by Ward Cunningham [8], to describe 
the need to recognize the potential long-term negative effects 
of immature code that is made during the software 
development lifecycle. A recent definition was provided by 
Avgeriou et al. [4] who define TD as “In software-intensive 
systems, technical debt is a collection of design or 
implementation constructs that are expedient in the short term, 
but set up a technical context that can make future changes 
more costly or impossible. Technical debt presents an actual or 
contingent liability whose impact is limited to internal system 
qualities, primarily maintainability and evolvability”.  
TD has been the focus of much recent research, but this 
research has been mostly focused on mature software 
companies, where large amount of TD is considered to be 
detrimental to the long-term success of software development 
[24]. However, deliberately accumulating TD could be much 
more beneficial since it can considerably speed up time-to-
market, allowing them to release their product to end-users 
faster, get feedback, evolve the software, and preserve capital 
[14]. However, TD must be managed to ensure it is addressed 
at an appropriate time; unmanaged TD can have negative 
consequences, such as the death of the startup itself [7]. 
There is a current paucity of empirical research focusing 
specifically on TD and startups [25]. This paper reports on a 
qualitative study that examines the organizational factors that 
influence the introduction of TD and the benefits and 
challenges of deliberate taking on TD. Through interviews with 
16 professionals at seven different startups, we identified six 
organization factors that lead to TD. In addition, we present a 
list of benefits and challenges of TD in startups, which can be 
considered by practitioners to aid them in the TD decisions. 
  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In 
Section II we describe the background and related work. Our 
research methods are described in Section III. We describe the 
cases in Section IV. The results are presented in Section V. 
Finally, we discuss the implications and limitations of our 
work in Section VI, and offer a brief conclusion in Section VII. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
In this section, we provide a complete description of a 
software startup, provide some background on the startup 
lifecycle, and review related work on TD in startups. 
A. Software Startups: A Definition 
Giardino et al. [10] define software startups as those 
“organizations focused on the creation of high-tech and 
innovative products, with little or no operating history, aiming 
to aggressively grow their business in highly scalable 
markets”. Sutton [23] presents different characteristics that 
reflect both engineering and business concerns, which software 
startup companies must operate within. Software startups are 
relatively young and inexperienced compared to more 
established and mature development organizations, and they 
commonly have very little accumulated experience or history. 
Typically, their resources are limited, and they primarily focus 
on getting the product out, promoting the product, and building 
up strategic alliances. Their business is dependent on 
influences from various sources, such as investors, customers, 
partners, and competitors. The software these startup 
companies are developing are commonly technologically 
innovative products, and their developing often involves 
cutting-edge development tools and techniques [23]. 
B. Software Startups Life Cycle 
Crowne [9] identified four distinct stages for a software 
startup: startup, stabilization, growth, and maturity. Each stage 
has different types of critical product development issues that 
potentially can lead to company failure. The first “Startup” 
phase refers to the period between product idea and the first 
sale. This stage is characterized by a product where the product 
doesn’t meet the customer’s requirements and is unreliable and 
fails frequently. Rectifying defects takes longer than expected 
and often creates additional defects [9]. The second 
“stabilization” phase begins when the first customer takes 
delivery of the product and ends when the product is stable 
enough to be commissioned without any overhead on product 
development. During this stage, a divide between developers 
can be spotted, where the developers who join the company 
early, and those who are recruited later differ in terms of that 
the early developers mount significant resistance to 
organizational change. During this stage, the non-functional 
requirements such as security, reliability, scalability, and 
performance gain additional attention, and the result of the 
previously introduced sub-optimal solutions becomes evident 
[9]. The third “growth” phase takes place when the product can 
be commissioned for new customers without creating any 
overhead on the development team. This phase ends when 
market size, share, and growth rate have been established, and 
all business processes necessary to support product 
development and sales are in place. In this stage, new features 
implementation requires a coordinated program of activities 
across functional areas including product development, 
professional services, support, and sales and marketing, which 
stresses the importance of having a repeatable process for 
software development implementation. The last “maturity” 
stage occurs when the company has evolved from a startup into 
a mature organization, where, e.g., market size, share, and 
growth rate have been established In this stage also all 
processes necessary to support product development and sales 
are in place [9]. 
C. Startups and Technical debt 
There is a lack of research studies on TD management in 
software startups [25]. Giardino et al. [10], conducted an 
empirical study addressing how startups employ software 
development strategies, using a Greenﬁeld Startup Model 
(GSM), which also covers startups and TD to some extent. 
Giardino et al. describe that to be faster, startups may introduce 
TD as an investment, whose repayment may never come due, 
with the long-term negative effects on morale, productivity, 
and product quality. Further, in their study they state that 
“Startups achieve high development speed by radically 
ignoring aspects related to documentation, structures, and 
processes”, and that “instead of traditional requirement 
engineering activities, startups make use of informal 
speciﬁcation of functionalities through ticket-based tools to 
manage low-precision lists of features to implement, written in 
the form of self-explanatory user stories”. 
Gralha et al. [21] investigated the evolution of requirements 
practices of software startups. They found that TD is one of the 
six factors that influence the requirements practices of a 
startup. They identified three phases regarding the 
accumulation of TD in startups. They also identified trigger 
points that cause startups to transition from one phase to the 
next. An increase in the number of employees and software 
features causes startups to transition from  simply knowing and 
accepting TD to tracking and recording it. Then, when their 
client retention rate goes down, or they begin to see an increase 
in negative feedback, they begin to manage and control TD. 
Another study which to some extent covers TD in startups 
is presented by Yli-Huumo et al. [28]. In that study, they 
investigate the relationship between business model 
experimentation and TD, with the goal of understanding if 
conducting these types of experimentations have any effect on 
the amount of TD occurring during the software life cycle. The 
concept of a business model experimentation in their study 
refers to when a company uses the technique to validate 
assumptions made on a product from real customers before the 
actual product is created. An example of this can be illustrated 
when a Minimum Viable Product (MVP) is used to test the 
business model by collecting and measuring customer feedback 
[28]. Since adopting the technique of business model 
experimentation is a conventional approach in both startups 
and larger companies [28], this study is somewhat related to 
ours. The result of their research showed that there is a 
relationship between business model experimentation and the 
occurrence of TD and also that focusing too much on business 
model experimentation and not on remediation of TD can have 
consequences to the product quality. 
  
In a recent study by Klotins et al. [13], where the authors 
explore how startups estimate TD, the precedents for 
accumulating TD, and to what extent startups experience 
outcomes associated with TD, it was found that TD peaks at 
the growth stage and that the number of people in a team 
amplifies precedents for TD and finally that there is an 
association between a startup outcome and their TD 
management strategy. 
Unterkalmsteiner et al.’s [25] research agenda for software 
startups states that researchers must build a more 
comprehensive, empirical knowledge base to support 
forthcoming software startups. They list several research 
question related to TD, and by answering these questions, they 
state that it could help clarify the role of design decisions in 
software development in the context of a software product 
roadmap, similarly to what happens in other engineering 
disciplines. The overall goal of the research questions listed by 
Unterkalmsteiner et al. [25] address in what way practitioners 
will be able to make better decisions considering the 
characteristics of the current software product implementation. 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The goal of this study is to understand how software 
startups reason about TD. In particular, we are interested in the 
organizational factors that impact TD together with the 
potential benefits and challenges of TD. We, therefore, aim at 
answering the following research questions: 
RQ1: What organizational factors influence the accumulation 
of TD in software startups? 
RQ2: What are the challenges and benefits of Technical Debt 
for software startups?  
In order to answer these research questions, we investigated 
the strategy of software development in different software 
startup companies by interviewing 16 practitioners in seven 
different startup companies, working in seven different areas.  
A. Participants 
We collected data from software professionals active in 
seven different software startup companies, shown in TABLE 
I.  The sample population was selected using a non-probability 
sampling technique [27], where the selection of participant 
companies was obtained using convenience sampling. The 
startup companies were located in two different countries. The 
companies are described in more detail in Section IV. 
B. Data Collection 
Initially, we ran two workshops (one in each country) with 
participants from four different startups (A, B, C, and D). The 
workshops included both a presentation made by one of the 
authors about TD, followed by a group discussion where the 
participants explored their own experiences with TD within 
their startup companies. Each workshop lasted about 120 
minutes and in total 12 practitioners from the investigated 
startup companies participated. 
 
TABLE I.  STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
Role Company Country Segment 
Developer 
A Sweden Sport 
Developer 
Developer 
B Sweden Energy 
Developer 
Developer 
C New Zealand Retail 
CEO / Developer 
Co-founder / Developer 
Co-founder / Developer 
Co-founder / Developer 
CEO 
D New Zealand Medical 
CFO 
COO 
Senior architect 
Advisor (Business and 
Technology) 
E Sweden Media 
CEO F Sweden 
Software 
Development  
Chairman of the board G Sweden Mental Health 
 
The goal of these workshops was to introduce the 
participants to the study, to align and equip them with relevant 
knowledge about the concept of TD and to gather background 
and contextual information on each participating startup 
company in preparation for the following interviews. 
We conducted semi-structured (as suggested in [20]), face-
to-face interviews with 16 professionals from seven different 
companies in two different countries. To improve the reliability 
of collected data at least two of the authors participated in each 
interview session. Each interview lasted between 60 and 120 
minutes and was digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
The questions were prepared by three of the authors together. 
The aim of the interviews was to understand the 
accumulation and refactoring of TD and what contextual 
aspects (related to the startup's environment) influenced such 
accumulation. We started by asking participants to describe 
their startup company and product and a. We asked follow-ups 
to learn about the contextual aspects of the startups (inspired by 
[18]). Next, we asked about TD. Specifically, we asked: 
 Describe some critical TD issues. 
 Which TD issues were refactored (and when)? 
 Which TD issues are planned to be refactored (and when)?  
 If TD issues are not planned to be refactored, why not? 
 What value did the accumulated TD give the company? 
 What cost was (or will be) paid to remove the TD? 
 What extra costs were (or will be) paid because of the TD? 
 What led to the accumulation of TD? 
 What roles, processes, guidelines, and strategies were used 
for TD? 
  
Finally, to get more insight into the existing TD, we also 
jointly ran the software SonarQube [2], and AnaConDebt [1] 
during the interviews. None of the companies previously used 
these tools, and they were not familiar with the output from the 
tools in advance. We asked questions on:  
 What issues were revealed and were they already known? 
 Would it have helped to use the tool (and when)? 
 Will you use the tool in the next iterations? 
C. Data Analysis 
We used thematic analysis [5] to identify, analyze, and 
report patterns and themes within the interview data. Thematic 
analysis involves searching across a dataset to find repeated 
patterns of meaning. The thematic analysis provides a flexible 
and useful research tool, which offers a detailed, and yet 
complex account of the collected data.  
The thematic analysis was conducted using a six-phase 
guide. First, the audio-recorded qualitative data collected from 
interviews were transcribed, and we familiarized ourselves 
with the data through careful reading of the transcripts. The 
second step involved the production of initial codes from the 
data, where we organized the data into meaningful groups. The 
third phase focused on searching for themes by sorting the 
different codes into potential themes and collating all the 
relevant coded data extracts within each identified theme. Each 
extract of data was assigned to at least one theme and, in many 
cases, to multiple themes. For example, the citation “if it [the 
software from a third-party application] lifts and take off, we 
can build our own solution” was coded as “Third party” in the 
theme “Software development Process.” To ensure that the 
coding was performed in a consistent and reliable fashion and 
in order to triangulate the interpretation of the data and to avoid 
bias as much as possible, two authors synchronized some of the 
output of the coding, following guidelines provided by 
Campbell et al. [6]. The fourth phase focused on the revised set 
of candidate themes, involving the refinement of those themes. 
When needed, we revised the themes or created a new theme. 
The fifth phase focused on identifying the essence of each 
theme and determining what aspect of the data is captured by 
each theme. The final phase of the thematic analysis took place 
when we had a set of fully developed themes, and involved the 
final analysis and write-up of the publication. We have made a 
figure illustrating how the codes and the corresponding themes 
were assigned during the thematic analysis available at 
https://figshare.com/articles/Thematical_Analysis/6115172. 
IV. DESCRIPTION OF CASES 
In this Section, to provide more context for our study, we 
describe the companies in more detail. TABLE II.  summarizes 
the seven companies that participated in this study. As can be 
seen, there is diversity across all aspects. We also indicate the 
startup stage for each company (using the stages in Crown’s 
[9] classification of startups, which we described in Section 
II.B). Across the seven cases, all stages are represented by at 
least one of the cases in this study.  
Figure 1 shows how TD was accumulated or addressed in 
each stage. All companies reported accumulating significant 
TD in the startup phase. Surprisingly, two companies reported 
undertaking either a major refactoring or a complete redesign 
during the startup phase prior to securing their first customer. 
Both of these cases were due to unintentional issues with the 
code or the design. During the stabilization phase, most 
companies reported addressing the TD that accumulated in the 
previous stage either by taking on formal refactoring initiatives 
or by informally removing TD as needed. The two companies 
in the growth and maturity stages indicated that most of the TD 
had been addressed before entering these stages. Only two of 
the companies, C and F, had not yet performed a large 
refactoring or redesign, but both planned this for the future. 
TABLE II.  DESCRIPTION OF CASES 
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A Mobile app Sport 2.5  None Initially external then 
in-house 
Founder, CTO, CMO, 3 
developers, one salesperson 
2 junior, 1 senior 
+ senior CTO 
Some agile practices 
(e.g. sprint planning) 
B Mobile and 
web apps  
Energy 6 High In-house CEO, 5 developers, two sale 
reps 
4 senior, 1 junior Scrum 
C Web app  Retail 2 High In-house 4 Founders  All junior No formal process 
D Web app  Medical 2 None In-house 3 Founders, 2 Technical staff All senior Some agile practices 
(e.g. Kanban, CI) 
E SaaS app Media 9* Low In-house 35 employees (Two-thirds are 
developers) 
All junior Some agile practices 
F Web app Software 2 High Combination in-house 
and consultant 
Founder + consultant as 
needed 
Senior Scrum 
G Mobile app Mental 
Health 
6 None Initially external then 
in-house 
Founder, CTO, 3 developers, 
1 salesperson 
3 junior + senior 
CTO 
Scrum 
* Today this startup is 9 years old, but the data collected for this startup reflects a time period of 3-5 years after they were founded 
  
 
Fig. 1. Overview of TD strategies across Crowne’s [9] stages for each Startup. 
V. RESULTS 
The following subsections present results for the research 
questions presented in Section III and the results are grouped 
according to each research question.  
A. What organizational factors influence the accumulation of 
TD in software startups? (RQ1)  
Our analysis has identified many factors that influenced the 
amount of TD that the startups accumulated. 
1) Experience of software developers  
Our results indicate that the experience level of the 
software developers can have both positive and negative 
influence on the accumulation of TD. As startups are typically 
very small in terms of number of developers initially, the 
experience level of individual developers can be impactful.  
Less experienced (junior) developers often unintentionally 
accumulate TD due to their lack of experience. As one 
interviewee from Company A stated, “It's really good to have 
at least one guy that is more experience in the team.” Another 
interviewee from Company E explained this as: “Junior 
developer are less able to project outcome to the future about 
how the system is likely to evolve, which means that they have 
a tendency to focus on the ‘here and now’, and solve the 
today's requirement whereas people that are experienced can 
often predict a little bit more easily what is likely to come in 
the future and already start to prepare the system for that.” 
Thus, junior developers are more likely to introduce 
unintentional TD due to their lack of experience. 
More experienced (senior) software developers are more 
aware of and have accumulated more experience about the 
effect of introducing TD, compared to junior developers. Thus, 
having senior developers to guide the development is very 
beneficial. However, senior developers are more expensive, 
and startups typically cannot afford to have many senior 
developers. “I think that it would be very expensive to get 
another very experienced person. And maybe it's not worth it.” 
In addition to high salary costs, senior developers may be 
less likely to intentionally accumulate TD if they have 
experience working on more mature software products that are 
not under such extreme time pressures to get to market. A 
participant from Company D stated, “If we had had the 
knowledge or the insight, we probably would have taken on 
board technical debt earlier on, but I think because we ended 
up hiring senior developers that were used to working in 
certain ways with testing and re-testing everything.  They 
ended up building, a fairly robust, as far as we can tell, but for 
our purposes, there might have been something over-
engineered perhaps.” Senior developers may be less willing to 
operate in an unstructured and less quality oriented approach. 
For example, one interviewee from Company A said: “So, you 
need to be more flexible, and if you are senior maybe you 
aren’t ready to cope with that.” This could cause startups 
delays in getting to market if TD is always avoided in favor of 
producing high quality software. 
2) Software knowledge of startup founders 
We found that the knowledge of the founders, related to 
software development, has an impact on how TD is 
accumulated. Founders with limited software development 
knowledge are less likely to accumulate TD intentionally. 
Since they are unable to implement the product themselves, 
they are likely to employ an external consultancy company or 
hire in-house developers to implement the first software 
solution, which involves a significant investment prior to being 
able to receive revenue from the software. The founders 
typically expect a high-quality implementation in return for 
this investment since they tend to have no knowledge about the 
benefits of TD. 
  
On the other hand, when the startup founders are 
experienced software developers, they are more likely to 
implement the product on their own. They often accumulate a 
large amount of TD because they focus on producing the first 
release quickly. They view the initial release as more 
expendable since they have not invested money towards its 
development (despite having invested their time). 
3) Employee growth 
We found that when startup teams were remaining stable in 
terms of the number of developers, they did not feel a need to 
reduce their TD since the issues related to the TD affected only 
the developers, not the customers. The participants did not 
believe their TD impacted product performance or usability. 
While the TD did make the code more difficult to extend or 
modify, the existing developers were already familiar with the 
TD in the code, so it was not necessary to reduce the TD. 
However, the addition of new developers caused the TD to 
decrease for several reasons. First, the existing developers 
reduce the technical debt prior to hiring new developers. The 
developers want the code to be easier to understand so that new 
developers can be onboarded more quickly. They also do not 
want new developers to unintentionally introduce additional 
technical debt because they are modeling their own code on 
existing TD. For example, an interviewee at company B stated: 
“But as time goes on, the quality of real code, or its readability 
and how easy it is to work with, becomes more and more 
important. It is very easy when you as a developer comes into a 
project that you start writing code in the way of the existing 
code base. You kind of go ‘oh, this is how they do it here,’ and 
that is not always a positive thing. A lot of time that is quite a 
negative thing, because, you slip into those habits and before 
you know it, all the things that you personally hold true about 
what good code is, you are not doing that anymore”. This fear 
of duplicating TD was also described by one interviewee from 
Company A stating: “And if you come in as a new developer, 
you might copy-paste some code, and you copy-paste that old 
thing of doing it, and we get the more messy code. And that is 
what we don't want.” 
In addition to the existing developers purposely reducing 
TD, new developers also remove TD as it is difficult to extend. 
The existing developers may be so familiar with the code, that 
they no longer notice the problems, while they will be more 
obvious to the new developers. For example, a developer from 
Company D said “I mean there’s a big refactor when they 
brought me on. …[we] ended up throwing a lot of code out and 
rewriting it.  And that was probably because of the technical 
debt side of things in there, using constants throughout and the 
like.” Our results corroborates to some extent the results found 
by Klotins et al. [13] stating that “increase in team size is also 
associated with outcomes of technical debt”. 
4) Uncertainty 
In general, uncertainty about the future of the organization 
and product is very common characteristic in the startup 
companies. Our results suggest that, not surprisingly, the 
uncertainty plays a major role when making decisions about 
TD.  One of the interviewees from Company C put this as 
“with these sorts of projects, you need to build a business case, 
and you’d be silly to like build something with no technical 
debt in it until you’ve at least proven that it’s something you 
have to pay for. As soon as we confirm that there will be 
[revenue], and see the money starting to come in, that’s when 
you probably start to look at the repaying the technical debt”. 
Another participant from Company D stated “there was a point 
where basically we said, okay, now we just need to stop 
spending money because we don’t know if this is even going to 
be a viable project and if it’s going to generate any money or 
anybody’s going to want to buy it”. This uncertainty causes 
startups to accumulate significant TD so they can release a 
proof-of-concept as quickly as possible. Once their idea is 
validated and they have a number of paying clients, they can 
worry about paying off their TD – possibly be rewriting the 
entire codebase from scratch. 
5) Lack of development process 
None of the interviewed startup companies adopted a 
systematic software development process, and the need of 
having such a process was not considered by the interviewees 
to be important during the first phases in the startups’ life-
cycle. However, this topic was brought up as a challenge, 
especially when the startup grows and hires more developers. 
A lack of processes for the management, identification, and 
prioritization of TD means that TD decisions are often made ad 
hoc, and there are no consistent decisions being made across 
the team. This is especially important as the team grows to 
ensure there is conformity. As one interviewee in company A 
said: “Multiple ways of doing things, are spreading at the same 
time… I mean, it is quite important for me, when we start to 
grow, that we have the same way of writing code.” 
6) Autonomy of developers (related to TD) 
Related to the lack of development process, developers 
often have full autonomy to decide when to take on TD and 
plan when to refactor the TD. Developers typically do not 
discuss TD-related decisions with others. While this allows for 
flexible work and short decision paths, it means developers, 
who are often not financially invested in the project, are 
making very important decisions without possibly considering 
the financial repercussions of these decisions. 
This can be especially problematic when employing 
external software consultancies since decisions tend to made 
based on the benefits to the consultancy company, rather than 
making the best decision for the software product under 
development. The consultancy could decide to minimize TD 
because they want to maintain a high-quality reputation for 
their company and do not want to deliver software that is not 
maintainable. If the development is not on a fixed price 
contract, this desire for perfection could cost the startup 
significant time and money. On the other hand, they may be 
driven to take on significant TD since they know they do not 
need to maintain the software and they are driven by the desire 
to save money during the development. For example, the 
interviewee from Company G stated: “the externally hired 
consultants, they just did what was asked of them in their 
contract, with the lowest possible development effort. That is 
commonly how it works with externally hired developers, they 
do not really care about Technical Debt, they care about 
delivering the software according to the given specification 
  
they are paid for.” We saw only one case where developers 
were not given full autonomy regarding TD decisions. The 
founders of this company found being involved in even trivial 
implementation decisions very useful. One of the founders of 
Company D said “I think that they got used to basically 
involving us in their decision-making even though on a 
relatively trivial scale so that they’d ask about everything… 
And then we could understand and be involved in making those 
decisions about, how much debt and things will take on, even 
though we didn’t call it debt.  And there was a point probably 
about two-thirds of the way through the project where ‘cause 
we’d often get updates on estimates of hours required to 
complete certain tasks so we’d keep an eye on how much 
money we were spending.”  
TABLE III.  ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING TD IN STARTUPS 
Factor Level TD Reason 
Experience 
of 
developers 
 
low 
(junior) 
increases 
poor design decisions 
(unintentional) 
high 
(senior) 
increases 
developers aware of benefits of TD 
(intentional) 
decreases 
developers accustomed to producing 
high quality software 
Software 
knowledge 
of founders  
low decreases 
founders unaware of TD benefits; 
large investment for developers 
causes desire for high-quality 
high increases 
founders develop product 
themselves; code seen as expendable 
Employee 
growth 
stable stable 
devs already familiar with code (and 
its TD); no impact to customer 
increasing decreases 
existing devs refactor to make 
onboarding easier  
existing devs refactor to prevent a 
culture of “bad” code 
new devs refactor because code not 
readable 
Uncertainty 
high increases goal: reduce dev time and cost 
decreasing decreases TD repaid after market validation 
Lack of dev. 
process 
--- varies ad hoc decisions 
Autonomy 
of 
developers 
high varies 
developers make decisions without 
any guidance (possible poor 
business decisions) 
low varies strategic decisions made 
 
 
B. What are the challenges and benefits of deliberately 
introducing Technical Debt for software startups? (RQ2) 
In this section, we explore how software startups determine 
and reason about both the challenges and benefits of 
intentionally introducing TD. In general, startup companies 
deliberately introducing TD, have a positive attitude of doing 
that. They are also relatively aware of the harmful effects these 
decisions can have on the future software in terms of impeding 
innovation and expansion of their software systems.  
1) Benefits of intentional technical debt 
We identified many benefits of intentionally introducing 
TD in software startups.  
Cutting development time in order to be able to release 
the product as quickly as possible is seen as a large benefit for 
startups. Getting to market quickly can: 
 enable fast feedback from the customers. An interviewee in 
Company A said: “We prefer to cut some corners to 
improve the speed, and get something out instead of making 
it more mature directly” ….”It is more important to get to 
the market fast and get feedback from the users, then to 
focus on avoiding TD, taking on TD is ok.” 
 increase revenue. One of Company C’s founders said, 
“Yeah, we probably wouldn’t have got the contract earlier, 
right… Then we wouldn’t have the capital”. Another 
participant from Company A said “we are a startup, and we 
need to make money. We need to get things working, but 
they don't need to be perfect”. 
Another benefit is the preservation of startup capital 
since commonly startup companies have less money in the 
early stages. A participant from Company D stated, “it’s just 
that we had to get the code out the door. And we had to get it 
so that we could afford it.” Another participant from Company 
F said “by taking the first technical debt, we spent 10% of what 
we would have spent if we would have done the whole product 
without TD.” 
Related to saving money and time, another benefit is the 
decreased risk. Since the startups involve uncertainty, it is 
sometimes wise to invest as little money and time as possible 
prior to validating the idea through evaluation of the product. A 
participant from Company F said: “In case the product would 
turn out to be a failure, we would have saved 90% of the 
money…we avoided a big risk, and we reduced uncertainty 
thanks to technical debt. It was a great decision, I think.” 
Intentional TD also allows startups to stay flexible. When 
they do not spend large amounts of money or time developing 
new features, they are more willing to discard them and alter 
the product significantly when needed. Thus, the TD allows 
them to make more objective decisions. “If you put too much 
time and effort in there, it could be harder to throw it away in 
the next version. So, I think it's not always bad that you don't 
do the best”. 
2) Challenges of intentional technical debt 
Despite the benefits of intentional TD, we also identified 
challenges since the sub-optimal solutions would eventually 
need to be fixed. The two companies who initially hired an 
external consultancy company to implement the first software 
solution failed in doing so. Most of the initial implementation 
was later removed and replaced by in-house developers, 
causing significant delays and additional expenditures. In such 
extreme cases, TD can cause the product failure or a business 
disruption. Another challenge of TD is the reduced 
scalability it often introduces. “If you validated it and it’s 
Answer to RQ1: We identified six organizational factors that 
influence the accumulation of technical debt: experience of 
developers, software knowledge of startup founders, employee 
growth, uncertainty, lack of development process, and the 
autonomy of developers regarding technical debt decisions. 
The results are summarized in TABLE III.  
  
looking good, you wanna be able to put your foot on the gas 
and go quickly and scale. And if the architecture’s not 
ready…” A first, light and sub-optimal solution may only work 
in a specific setting but will need to be refactored in order to 
scale the software. One developer from Company A put it 
“growing is not just like taking what we have and do the exact 
same thing because that will only scale to a specific 
limit…There was no segmentation of the code in any part. We 
started to split the code up, we started to segment and to 
separate the code, so that we also can scale different part of 
the code.” 
The interviewees mentioned different TD types such as 
architectural, infrastructural and source code related TD as 
having a substantial negative impact on the system growth. 
Another challenge is that the harmful effects of TD increases in 
severity as the software grows and when more developers were 
involved in the development process. Thus, the introduction of 
TD can have compounding effects on the development time 
and resources, since it will take more time to develop code on 
top of existing TD. Then, if the TD is removed later, it all of 
the code built on top of the TD will also potentially be 
impacted. As one interviewee at Company B put it: “In a 
greenfield project, I think there is an argument hacking 
together something that works quickly. But as time goes on, the 
quality of real code, or its readability and then how easy it is to 
work with, it becomes more and more important.” Another 
challenge is that fixing TD could increase risk. When fixing 
TD, it might create new bugs in the code, adding to the amount 
of future work that needs to be done. “The bugs will probably 
grow, especially if we try and fix it, spend time trying to fix it.” 
Finally, the introduction of TD requires the loss of 
productivity to be managed later. We found that during the 
early phases, startups rarely manage their TD and decisions are 
often made on an ad hoc basis and none of the interviewed 
startups used any software tools assisting their TD 
management strategy. In order to understand if the startups 
would consider using tools as beneficial, we jointly run both 
SonarQube and AnaConDebt on four of the  startups' software 
(A, B, C, and D). After running the tools we went through the 
output and assessed whether the result was perceived as useful 
or not. All the startups using SonarQube found it specifically 
valuable identifying specific areas within their codebase that 
could further be improved in terms of refactoring initiatives of 
TD. As the founder from Company D said, “I think this is very 
useful in terms of prioritizing the back end of what we have 
and what we need to sort of like work on.”  
The result of running AnaConDebt provided the startups 
with estimates on the TD principal and interest and also the 
growth of them with respect to different future scenarios, was 
also unanimous perceived as valuable to the startups’ TD 
management strategy. However, using these kind of tools was 
not a considered as a good choice during the first startup phase 
since it would have distracted the developers from being fast 
with the first product release. The output from running the 
tools cannot be reported due to confidentiality reasons. 
3) Good Enough Level 
When startup companies deliberately introduce TD, they 
implicitly decide what a Good Enough Level (GEL) of the 
software quality is and what amount of TD is acceptable to 
take on. They weigh the benefits and challenges of the TD 
when making their decisions (illustrated in 1). However, it is 
not usually an easy decision. A founder of Company D said 
“It’s difficult to balance where you’re constantly making 
decisions how do we balance what we’re spending on this, 
versus the likelihood of producing these results.”  
 
Fig. 2. Good Enough Level is achieved by considering the ideal balance 
between the benefits and challenges associated with intentional TD. 
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
In this section, we discuss recommendations for startups, 
compare our results to existing knowledge on accumulation 
and refactoring of TD in other contexts, and describe the 
limitations of this study. 
A. Recommendations for software startups 
Based on the finding related to the organizational factors 
that influence TD in startups and the benefits and challenges 
associated with TD, we have the following recommendations 
for startups. 
Balanced experience levels (of developers) needed. We 
found that junior developers often introduce unintentional TD. 
Senior developers are often more calculated in their TD 
decisions. However, senior developers may be less risk adverse 
if they have more experience working on more structured, 
mature products where quality is paramount. A mix of both 
senior and junior developers seems ideal to find the right 
balance between TD and quality. These results are in line with 
the ideas of Crown [9], who states that “The principal 
developer for the company must be highly experienced, and 
familiar with all aspects of software engineering practice. This 
person must also be an accomplished technical leader, as they 
will need to influence their less experienced colleagues”. 
Though, we advocate that junior developers are equally 
important. 
Answer to RQ2: Intentionally introducing technical debt 
allows startups to cut development time, enabling faster 
feedback and increased revenue, preserve their resources, 
decrease risk, and make more objective decisions. However, 
the technical debt causes reduced scalability, becomes more 
severe as the product grows, and introduces future 
development risks. Thus, deliberately introducing technical 
debt brings both benefits and challenges and startups must 
weigh these to determine a “Good Enough Level”. 
  
Unbiased technical advisors needed. When the startup 
founders do not have software development knowledge, those 
implementing the software are likely to make decisions that 
benefit their own needs, rather than the startup company. For 
example, they may cut corners to save their own time, or they 
may gold plate the software to build up their own reputation 
(and to increase their own revenue). Thus, startup founders 
who lack software development expertise should consider 
seeking technical guidance from someone other than the 
company or developers they hire to implement the solution so 
they can obtain unbiased advice related to TD decisions. 
Depending on the stage of the startup (and the available 
capital), this advice could be obtained by the introduction of a 
CTO or from an external consultant. 
Consider “contagiousness” of TD in prioritization. We 
found that TD is often removed as the number of developers 
increases. This is in line with the results of Gralha et al. [17]. 
We found there are various reasons for this decrease in TD. 
One of which is the removal of TD that could be “contagious” 
– new developers may model their code off existing TD or may 
directly duplicate poorly written code. Thus, in addition to 
prioritizing TD that might block key features planned in the 
upcoming iterations [8], contagious TD [16] should also be 
prioritized, especially during times of growth in the 
development team. If such TD is not removed, it can generate 
new TD in a vicious spiral, reducing the growth time and 
compromising the software quality [22], [12] and culture of the 
startup in the future. 
Encourage autonomy with high-level guidance. We 
found that in most startups, developers make TD-related 
decisions with full autonomy. Thus, they could possibly be 
making poor business decisions without considering the 
strategic repercussions of their decisions. Providing overall 
guidance to the developers, so they know what level and types 
of TD are appropriate can mitigate this risk, while still 
maintaining developer autonomy. 
B. Strategy to balance TD over time 
Startups need to balance several factors affecting the 
accumulation of TD, to reach a Good Enough Level. However, 
how do startups do this over time? We report, in Fig. 32, a first 
interpretation that helps to understand the strategy adopted by 
the studied cases in different phases.  
Fig. 2 shows the accumulation of TD with respect to each 
startup phase and key events. The black line suggests the 
accumulation of Technical Debt that has been preferred by the 
studied startups. We also show GELs ("Good Enough Level”), 
or else thresholds under which TD needs to be kept via 
strategic refactorings, otherwise causing possible disruptive 
events (red lines and crosses). Finally, in the bottom of the 
picture, we outline which mechanisms have been reported by 
the participants to be necessary and effective to keep a GEL of 
TD in a specific phase. In the startup phase, startups recklessly 
accumulate TD. This has been reported to be not only 
necessary, but very valuable to quickly satisfy the first 
customers, to reduce risks and costs. However, too much TD 
can still be disruptive in the first phase, leading to product 
failure and business disruption, if the acquired TD prevents the 
successful delivery of the MVP itself. In particular, the cases 
report that the domain specific technology needs to be well 
understood and that the usability of the product should not be 
overlooked (GEL1).  In the stabilization phase, a partial 
refactoring (Stabilization refactoring) is recommended to reach 
GEL2. In this case, the TD to be prioritized is the one blocking 
key features planned in the upcoming iterations for the delivery 
of the product to key customers. In addition, TD that is judged 
to be especially contagious (likely to spread to the new features 
and to be picked up by new developers) should be at least 
considered. The challenges if the startup fails to keep this level 
of TD is the difficulty (if not the halt) of evolving the system 
with new features, with the consequent loss of key customers. 
Additionally, while entering the growth phase, TD that is 
accessed by new developers can generate new TD in a vicious 
spiral, reducing the growth time and compromising the code 
and culture of the startup in the future. Here the high-level 
guidance and the experience of the developers are key to keep 
the right level of TD, but a budget needs to be allocated for the 
refactoring to reach GEL2. During the growth phase, there is a 
need to remove some more TD (Growth refactoring) to reach a 
GEL3. If the contagious debt is not removed in the previous 
phase, it needs to be removed here before hiring new 
developers. In addition, the code is optimized to be scalable 
and to be delivered to several customers in the market: the 
architecture of the system should be refactored to allow the 
productive management of customer variability, to reduce the 
cost of maintenance and operations for the developers, to avoid 
a loss of productivity. In the growth phase, several other 
mechanisms can be introduced to not only reduce the current 
TD, but also to prevent the accumulation of future TD (e.g. 
tools, processes). TD needs to be well communicated in order 
to make business decisions. In their maturity phase, startups 
seem to start behaving like mature companies. However, in this 
study, we do not have enough cases to report common 
practices related to this phase.  
C. Comparison of TD Management with non-Startups  
Looking at the current literature, we can see some 
differences with how startups accumulate and refactor TD, 
compared to large and more mature organizations. Some large 
and mature organizations might have internal innovation 
projects that have a more similar context to startups or might 
have high turnover of junior developers. Since we did not find 
studies on such context and TD, such cases are excluded from 
the following analysis and will require additional studies. In 
both startups and mature organizations, there is often a peak of 
accumulated TD at the beginning of feature development [17]. 
However, in mature organizations, there is usually a defined 
quality threshold, in the form of the desired software 
architecture or other quality models. In such cases, TD is 
referred to the divergence from such desired thresholds. Such 
reference points do not seem to exist in startups. Consequently, 
they tend to accumulate more TD, which is also considered a 
benefit. There is, naturally, some level of uncertainty in both 
startups and mature organizations at the start of a new project. 
However, the uncertainty in young startup companies is greater 
than in a mature company [11]. Thus, taking on a right amount 
of TD seems to be a well-established strategy to deal with the 
high levels of uncertainty. Another difference can be found on 
  
how inexperienced developers are considered in startups and 
mature companies. Inexperienced developers seems to be 
considered as less aware of the long-term effects of TD, which 
consequently leads them to be keener to accumulate it. 
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Fig. 3.   TD balanced differently in different startup phases 
This choice seems to fit with the importance to accrue TD 
in startups. However, as we have seen in all the analyzed cases, 
an experienced developer (technical lead or CTO) is crucial in 
the startup team to keep the TD level to desired thresholds. In 
contrast, in mature organizations, it is preferred to have team 
members that have a higher understanding of TD and to make 
sure that TD is not accumulated [15]. One of the main reasons 
is that code developed by mature organizations, especially in 
large projects, is continuously integrated with a large codebase 
and needs to be available and reliable for other teams’ work. In 
other words, TD has a bigger impact. Such impact is not 
present in the startup and stabilization phase of startup 
companies, but comes into play when the startup enters the 
growing phase.  
A similar difference can be seen with respect to processes 
and tools: a recent survey in the large organization [15] 
highlights how a third of the participants, answering the 
survey, use tools to track TD. In startups, we could see the 
complete lack and conscious avoidance of such processes and 
tools until the company reaches the growing phase. On the 
other hand, both in startups and partially (2/3 of the 
participants) in large organizations [15], we notice the lack of 
knowledge on how to implement such processes and what tools 
to use to keep TD at bay. Learning how to manage TD seems 
to be equally important for large companies and for startups 
entering the growth phase. 
In summary, despite some similarities exist regarding TD 
management between large, mature organizations and startups, 
the first three startup phases seem to stand out with respect to 
managing TD. This is due to the level of uncertainty, the 
environment, and the business context being different. 
Although this analysis includes a small sample of both startups 
and large companies, and more studies are needed to 
corroborate this analysis, we have some initial evidence 
suggesting that the strategic management of TD in startups 
might differ from the best practices related to large 
organizations.  
D. Limitations and Threats to Validity 
The main limitations of this study are related to the limited 
sample of startups investigated and to the qualitative nature of 
the investigation. However, these are limitations that can be 
considered acceptable in light of the exploratory purpose of 
this study. We preferred to gain a deep and rich understanding 
of the context of a few cases to build a holistic first theory 
rather than surveying the topic on a high level only.  
Specific threats to validity include construct validity related 
to the concept of TD, external validity with respect to the 
limited contexts analyzed, and reliability of the results affected 
by the high level of interpretation that both interviewees and 
researchers might have been injected in the study [20].  
To mitigate construct validity, we held a workshop with 
several of the participants in the startups to clearly define and 
align on what TD was. We gave concrete examples, we used 
the up to date definition of TD reported in the Dagstuhl 
seminar [4], and we asked the participants to share examples in 
order to test if their understanding matched the community’s 
definition. Additionally, when asking questions, we have 
always asked and probed the claims by inquiring for additional 
concrete examples.  
To mitigate the external validity threat, we collected 
information from two different countries in different 
geographical areas. In addition, the case companies represent 
different segments, and we interviewed different roles, from 
developers to CTOs to CEOs, to external advisors.  
Although we do not claim to provide fully generalizable 
results in this exploratory study, we have aimed at maximizing 
the coverage of our cases. Furthermore, we plan to expand our 
sample in the future, to reach a higher degree of validation of 
our results. Reliability threats were mitigated by assuring that 
two researchers were always present when conducting 
interviews, that one of the researchers was always attending all 
workshops and interviews for consistency purposes, and that 
the analysis was organized in two groups where researchers 
analyzed the codes separately and then merged the findings. In 
other words, we made sure that different observers were 
contributing in different phases of the data collection and 
analysis, reducing the bias of single researchers. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This exploratory study set out to provide a first 
understanding of how software startups reason about TD. 
Through interviews with 16 software professionals in seven 
different startup companies, we identified six organizational 
factors that influence the accumulation of TD in software 
startups (experience of developers, software knowledge of 
startup founders, employee growth, uncertainty, lack of 
development process, and the autonomy of developers 
regarding TD decisions). We also found that startups must 
strive towards a Good Enough Level, over time, for their 
product, while weighing the benefits and challenges associated 
with taking on TD. This study provides a set of 
recommendations and a first strategy which can be used by 
software startups to support their decisions related to the 
accumulation and refactoring of TD.  
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